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by
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Abstract
In this paper we analyze price formation in an industry where consumers have a 
priori beliefs on prices, and firms are aware of this fact. We show that if 
all consumers are identical, a (Nash) price equilibrium exists in which all 
firms quote a price which makes consumers expectation of finding a still smaller 
price not sufficient to bear the search cost. A similar analysis is performed 
























































































































































































In most models analyzing markets with dispersed prices, one assumes that 
consumers know the distribution of prices while they ignore which seller quotes 
which price. Then consumers search sequentially for the lowest price, stopping 
to search when the expected gain from leaving the last shop visited for a further 
search becomes non positive. On the other hand, if firms know this search 
procedure, they can manipulate the distribution of prices by choosing their own 
price in a manner which is most advantageous to them. An ■'equilibrium' distribut­
ion of prices may emerge, in which no firm can increase its revenue by unilateral 
deviation from the price it has chosen. This approach, initiated by Stigler (1961) 
has given rise to a significant research area, represented, among others, by the 
following papersl Carlson and McAfee (1983), Reinganum (1979), Rotschild (1973) 
and (1974), Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Stahl (1982).
With few exceptions (see for example, Rotschild (1974)) nobody has question­
ed the basic assumption of the above approach, namely that consumers are initial­
ly endowed with the knowledge of the true distribution of prices. Presumably the 
plausibility of this assumption relies on the fact that, in many market places, 
consumers can repeatedly observe the price fluctuations decided by the sellers, 
generating thereby a kind of learning process of the price distribution. 
Nevertheless, as long as the mechanism through which consumers 'learn' the 
distribution, has not been made explicit, it seems difficult to avoid questioning 
this assumption. Moreover this assumption is particularly inaccurate when no 
learning process can be experienced, simply because the product has not yet been 
sold before on the market. How could consumers know the true distribution of 
prices when these prices have never been set beforehand? At best, consumers rely on 
apriori beliefs about prices in orienting their search process on a particular 
path. This suggests that an alternative assumption, -which fits better the 
situation just depicted-, can be proposed to represent the informational endow­
ments of consumers. This assumption asserts that consumers have prior beliefs 
about the price set by the sellers, and use these beliefs in their sequential 
search for the lowest price. In other words, it is assumed that the price of 
each firm is viewed by a consumer as a random variable defined on some pre­
assigned range. Then, if firms do not face any shortage of information, they 
can predict exactly how consumers search decisions depend on their prior beliefs 
and on the price they set. Accordingly they can manipulate information gathering 
by the buyers in a way similar to the one described above, leading eventually to 
an equilibrium distribution of prices, in which no firm would gain by deviating 
from the price chosen at equilibrium.
In the present paper we retain the alternative assumption about the infor­
mation endowments of the consumers, and study the resulting equilibrium price 




























































































In the first model, we suppose that the unit search cost is the same for all 
consumers, who are also assumed to share identical prior beliefs on the price 
set by each firm. Then we prove that there always exists a price equilibrium, 
which is either the monopoly price, or that price which makes a consumer indif­
ferent between buying at that price from the last shop visited, or undertaking 
a further search for a lower price.
In the second model, we assume that the unit search cost varies from consumer 
to consumer, because consumers are located at varying distances from the sellers; 
in other words, we combine a model of price search with a model of spatial 
competition. Then we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence 
of a price equilibrium when there are two sellers, and all consumers have the 
same prior beliefs on prices represented by a uniform distribution over a given 
interval of prices,
2. THE HOMOGENEOUS CASE
Let us first consider a situation with n 'population centers' h, h - 1,...,n, 
and a single shop at each center. Demand at that shop is equal to D(p), where 
D(p) denotes the demand function at the shop if the search cost would be infinite: 
in that case no consumer from other population centers than h would buy from 
seller located in the hth population center. If all firms quote the same price p 
we assume that the expected demand at firm h is equal to D(p). Consumers search 
sequentially with recall; no cost is incurred by a customer if he visits the 
shop in his own population center, but he must pay a unit search cost c, c >  0, 
per visit, to get information on any other price. We assume:D(p) concave,
D'(p) <  0 and there exists p such that D(p) =0, Vp >  p. Each consumer buys at 
most a single unit of the (homogeneous) product, and is willing to buy a unit 
at zero price. Also zero production cost is assumed throughout.
The price p at each shop is viewed as a random variable by the consumers.
This random variable is independently and identically distributed across firms 
and consumers ('homogeneous' case). We denote by F(p) the distribution function 
of p, and by f(p) the corresponding density;p takes its values in [0,p]-: both 
F and f are assumed continuous functions of p. Finally we assume
c + E(p) <  p ,
where E(p) is equal to pf(p)dp : the expected price plus the unit search cost
does not exceed the highest possible price. Next we prove
PROPOSITION 1




























































































(p,...,p,..,,p), with p = Min{pM ,p*}, where p^ denotes the maximizer of pD(p) 
(the monopoly price) and p* the solution of
JP F(p) dp 0 c , (1)
Proof:
First it is wellknown that if consumers search sequentially, they leave a 
firm if, and only if, the price p observed at that firm exceeds p* (see, for 
instance, Rothschild, M. (1974)) : the price p* makes the expected gain from 
leaving a shop quoting p* for a further search exactly equal to zero. Indeed,
• /v. /x/
denoting by ip(p) the expected gain if a price p is observed, it is easily derived 
that
<p(p) = p - c - p(1-F(p)) - J0P pf(p) dp 
= JP F(p) dp - c
To show that p* exists is equivalent to showing that there exists, p* such that 
ip(p*) = 0. Notice that ip(0) = - c and 3cp/9p >  0. Furthermore
<P(p) = p - c - p(1-F(p)) + /P pf(p) dp0
= p -  c + E ( p ) > 0  ,
where the last inequality follows by assumption. Accordingly, by continuity of 
tp, which follows from the continuity of F, there must exist p* such that ip(p*) = 0, 
p* in the compact interval [0,p ].
Now assume that p* <  pM and that, contrary to the proposition, the n-tuple 
(p*,..,,p*) is not a price equilibrium. Then there exists a firm h and a price 
Pjj J* P* yielding a strictly higher expected revenue than E(H(p*,...,p*))
(E denotes the expectation operator and II the revenue function). Notice that p^ 
cannot exceed p*; otherwise all the customers in the h*"̂  population center who 
have visited firm h at first, leave that firm, searching for a lower price, and 
they find it indeed in any other shop than h (namely they find p*!). But then
0 = E(H(p*.... . ,...,p*) <  E(II(p*.... p*.....p*) = D(p*)-p*, a contradiction.
On the other hand, if p^ is strictly smaller than p*, then all customers in the 
h*"̂ 1 population center who have first visited firm h, remain in that firm and
E(II(p*.... ph .....p*)) = ph D(ph) <  P* D(p*) = E(n(p*,...,p*.....P*)), where





























































































Finally if <  p*, each firm is not constrained by p*, and setting the 
monopoly price p^ it keeps in the shop all its potential customers, while 
simultaneously maximizing its expected payoff.
Q.E.D.
Thus the mechanism of price competition underlying the above analysis is 
much different from the mechanism of non cooperative price competition for an 
homogeneous good when there is perfect information. There we know that prices 
have to descend to zero, because at any strictly positive price, it pays to 
undercut the competitor. This cutthroat competition remains valid here, for all 
prices which exceed p*. However no firm has an interest to ..undercut p* itself: 
In any case customers remain in the shop, and the firm may behave as a 'local 
monopolist' on this segment of the market.
On the other hand we notice that 9n* 1 >  1 and that p* = c + p*(l-F(p*))
p 3c F(p*)
+ y  pf(p) dp >  c. Furthermore it is worth noticing that the price equilibrium o
does not change with the number of firms, at least as long as the unit search 
cost c does not depend on the number of firms. One should expect however the 
search cost c to be a decreasing function of n: when the 'density' of firms
increases on the network where consumers are located, the unit search cost should 
diminish . Since ■ J <  0, a reasonable conjecture is that the price
equilibrium tends to zero when the number of firms tends to ®. Finally we notice 
that no price dispersion arises at equilibrium, and that at the same price, 
no consumer undertakes any search.
A natural question to raise is whether the above properties continue to 
hold when consumers are no longer identical. In the next section we analyze this 
question assuming a continuum of consumers with varying search costs and a 
uniform distribution as representing their prior beliefs.
3. THE HETEROGENEOUS CASE
We consider in the following a classical Hotelling's location model. On a 
line of length L, two sellers, 1 and 2, of a homogeneous product, with zero 
production cost, are located at respective distances a and b, from the end 
points of this line (a + b <  L; a 0, b >  0) . Customers are evenly distributed 
along the line and each customer , indexed by t, t 6 [0,L], consumes exactly a 
single unit of this commodity, irrespective of its price. In Hotelling’s original 
model the prices quoted by each seller are known from the start to all consumers, 
who place their purchase order to the seller quoting the lowest delivered price. 
Here, it is assumed alternatively, that each customer only knows with certainty 
the price announced by the seller nearest to him on the linear segment. While 
each customer ignores, therefore, one of the two prices it is assumed that he can 
acquire this information at a cost which depends linearly on the distance separat­




























































































accordingly, either buy at the known price from the nearest shop, or postpone 
the purchase until he has first searched for the price set by the more distant 
seller, The decision whether to purchase at the known price without search or 
whether to solicit the other seller depends on the expectation of finding a 
lower price. Here, as in section 2, we shall represent consumers expectations 
about the unknown price by a probability function F(p) defined over some range 
[0,p], Again F(p) has to be interpreted as a probability distribution, the form 
of which is determined by the consumers prior beliefs about prices. Since we 
have assumed that consumer t has no information on the price quoted by the more 
distant seller, it is natural to assume that F(p) is an uniform distribution 
on [0,p] with corresponding uniform density f(p). We normalize prices so that 
p = 1. To summarize: all customers t share the same prior uniform distribution 
F(p) on [0,1], where p denotes the price set by the firm located at the farthest 
distance from customer t. Since all consumers t in the set
A, d;£ ( t | 0 < t <  t i p i }
are located closer to seller 1 than seller 2, they have perfect information on 
the price p2 set by seller 1. Similarly consumers in the set
{«|tipi<t<u






The cost of acquiring information about the price at the more distant of 
the two sellers is then given by
c(t) = [ (L-b) - t] c , if t e A j 
= (t-a) c , if t G A
The decision to buy from the nearest seller, without search, rather than 
searching and then choosing the most favourable opportunity depends upon 
whether the search is expected to be profitable or not. The expected gains 
from the search for customer t is given by (for t 6 Aj)1 :





























































































* Pi “ J0Pl lpè+c(t)] dp2 ~ [pj+c(t)] dp2,
Pi
where p represents the observed value of p at location a, Then customer t in
(resp. Az) will search if and only if ip(p^, t) (resp. ip(p2,t) is greater than
zero; then he may buy from one or the other shop according as p̂  ^  P2 (resp. p2 ^  p2).
An important role in the following will be played by that price, -call it
p*(t) for t G A, and p*(t) for t G A,- which, when observed at the nearest shop 
1 1 2 z
makes consumer t indifferent between buying instantaneously without search, and 
searching. It is easily found that
P * ( t )  = \Æc(L-b-t) , t e a x
and





In order to have p*(t) and p*(t) in [0,1] the condition L <  ■=—  is held throughout, l 2 2c
The next proposition describes the market outcome resulting from the situation
just described when the two sellers choose their price in a non cooperative manner.
To this end let us derive the (contingent) demand functions of both sellers
Dj(pj,p2) and D2(Pl,p2). To simplify the analysis, consider figure 2, which





























































































If <  \/c (L-a-b) = “)> all customers t in Aj who firstyisit seller 1
remain in his shop and buy from him since p^ ^  p*(t) for all t £ .If
\/t (L-a-b) <  Pj <  p2, all customers in the set
2,________  P.
{11 Pj <  p*(t)} = {t|t e Aj» P: ^  \^c(L-b-t)} = [ 0,L-b~2^]
p2 L+a-b
still remain in the shop of seller 1, while customers in jL-b-j^, — ^ ^  leave 
and visit seller 2 where they find a price p^ higher than p̂  : accordingly they 
come back to seller 1 and buy from him. Moreover customers in the set 
{t|t e A2; p*(t) <  p^} who first visit seller 2 leave him and visit seller 1.
Since Pj <  p2, they also buy from seller 1. Finally if %/c(L-a-b) ^  P2 585 Pj > all
customers in the set
{111 e A p*(t) < p  } u {111 e A ;p*(t) < p  } 1 1  1 2 z Z
visit both shops, but buy from seller 2 (as a convention we shall assume that 
if both sellers quote the same price, each of them serves all custumers the closest 
to him, i.e. A^ for seller 1, and A 2 for seller 2). From this analysis, it 
follows that
V v V  "
L + a - b if p, ^  y/c (L-a-b) and p ^  y/c. (L-a-b)
= a + 2c if p >  \/c (L-a-b) and p <  p <  y/Zc (L-a)
= L -b - if Pj '> V 0 (L-a-b) and p2 <  p̂  <  V^c (L-b)
L + a - b if p = P2 ^  (L-a-b) .
Performing a similar analysis from the view point of seller 2 yields
(Pi ,P2) = L - a + b
= b + 2c
L - a + b 
2
if P2 ^  y/ c (L-a-b) and Pj <  y/c (L-a-b) 
if -y/c (L-a-b) <  p2 <  pi <  y/2c (L-b) 
if P2 = Pj >  V c (L-a-b)
if p2 >  \ZcTL-a-b) and Pj <  p2 <  yflc (L-a).





























































































There is a price equilibrium if, and only if,
(3)
(4)
and, whenever it exists, the price equilibrium is uniquely determined by
p* = p* = p* = VcCL-a-b) • 
def
Proof:
b + 3a <  L
and
a + 3b <  L ;
First let us show that there exists no pair of prices (Pj,P2) ^ (p*»P*) 
which is a price equilibrium. Assume on the contrary that the pair (Pj,P2) is 
a price equilibrium with p^ ^ p* for at least some i, i = 1,2. It is easy to 
see that no p. can be strictly smaller than p* : otherwise seller i could increase 
p^ while keeping in his shop all customers that are nearest to him, thereby 
increasing his revenue, a contradiction. Accordingly p J => p* and p2 >  p* with at 
least a strict inequality for some i. On the other hand, we must have p = "p .
p 2/'*■» /'** o j /v r  J
Assume on the contrary that Pj >  pz> say. Then D (p ,p ) = b + — , and 
~ 2 ~2 2 1 2
Pj Pj
P2 • (b + 2^) <  P2 • (b + for p2 <  p2 <  p jS a contradiction. So assume
finally p = p >  p*. Then 1 2
~  ~  ~  ~  T ~  ^  ^  ~  P2
PjD ^ P j .Pj) = Pj — ) <  (Pj-£) * D j CPj-g, P2) = (P1~e)(a+2^-) ,
~2
P 2 L + a - bfor e sufficiently small, since (a+^O >  ---- -̂--- • Consequently there exists
no pair of prices different from (p*,p*) which yielcfe a price equilibrium.
Now let us show that (p*,p*) is a price equilibrium if and only if both
inequalities (3) and (4) hold simultaneously. To this end let us assume that
p = p*, and compute the revenue R (p ,p*) p D (p ,p*) for seller 1. Then
2 1 i det i i i
R! (Pj »P*> = P j , L+2 b i f  Pi <  P* = P2 ;
Pj
= Pj • (L-b-— -) if Pj >  p* .





























































































Consequently p* = p is a best reply against p* = p if, and only if, the solution l 2
Pj to the problem
P?Max Pj-CL-b— )
*1
is smaller or equal to p*, i.e. iff pt ^  y/c (L-a-b) = n* i.e.
if and only if (3) holds. Similarly assume p* = p5 and compute the revenue 
R2(p*,p^) p^D^(p*,p^). As above, p* = is a best reply against p* = p̂
if, and only if, the solution p2 to the problem
P2
M#f p2(L"a'2^)
is smaller or equal to p*, i.e. iff 6^ \/ ̂  ^  \/c (L-a-b) = n*, i.e.
if, and only if, (4) holds.
Q.E.D.
Notice that if we restrict ourselves to symmetric locations (i.e . a = b), the 
pair of prices (p*,p*) is a price equilibrium if, and only if, both firms are 
located outside the quartiles (a = b <  . Figure 4 depicts the set of location
pairs (a,b) for which (p*,p*) is a price equilibrium.
On the other hand no price dispersion arises at equilibrium when it exists, 






























































































Finally, it is worth noticing, for further comparison, that performing a 
similar analysis, -but assuming that search costs are quadratic with respect to 
the distance2-, leads to drastically different conclusions. It can then be 
shown (see appendix) that a price equilibrium exists, if and only if, both firms 
are located at the two extremes of the road. To all pair of locations interior }
to the linear segment [0,L] no price equilibrium exists.
A. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed how price competition operates when a 
'subjective' price search, relying on a priori consumers' beliefs about prices, 
is subtituted to the objective price search, relying on the knowledge of the 
true distribution of prices. In the first model (the 'homogeneous case" of 
section 2) the equilibrium price is either the monopoly price, or the price 
which makes each consumer indifferent between buying at that price at the local 
shop, or searching. An analogous conclusion has been reached by Reinganum 
(1979) in a model of objective price search with a continuum of firms. As for 
the results of the second model, -when the search behaviour is presented in a 
spatial framework-, they have to be confronted with Hotelling's original work 
(Hotelling (1929)) and another paper which the authors are completing 
(Gabszewicz and Garella (1985)). In both Hotelling's model, -where consumers 
are perfectly informed,- and in the present one, there is a wide domain of 
location parameters entailing the absence of price equilibrium. However the 
mechanims which causes the existence of a price cycle, is very different in 
the two cases. In Hotelling's case, it relies on the incentive to each firm 
to undercut the price of its competitor when sellers are too close to each 
other; here, whatever the locations, the only possible equilibrium obtains at 



























































































each other, the revenue at that pair of prices, is 'heated' by a higher price 
where the firm quoting that price looses some customers. Thus the beating 
strategy is not the undercutting price but, on the contrary, a price which is 
higher than the candidate for an equilibrium. The difference between the two 
models is even more apparent in the case where search costs are assumed to be 
quadratic with the distance. While a price equilibrium exists at all location 
pairs under perfect information about prices (see d'Aspremont et al. (1979)), 
a price equilibrium never exists under imperfect information (except in the 
degenerate case where firms are located at the two extremes of the line) .
We have shown elsewhere (Gabszewicz and Garella (1985)) that if 'objec­
tive' price search, -meaning by this that consumers know the true distribution 
of prices,- is combined with a spatial framework, the nature of the price equi­
librium is drastically different. First prices must necessarily be different 
at each shop; second, for the existence of an equilibrium, firms cannot be too 
far apart from each other; finally there is search at equilibrium. From these 
examples we may conclude that the existence of competition between firms and 
the resulting equilibrium configurations of prices and firms' locations show 
























































































































































































1 Subscript 1 and 2 for prices must be interchanged in order to get 
ip(pz,t) for t e a 2.























































































































































































Consider the case where 
at the more distant of the two
the cost of acquiring information about the price 
sellers is given by quadratic costs, i.e.
For t 6 A , 1
c(t) = c[ (L-b-t)]2 , if t £ Aj
= c(t-a)2 , if t E A2 .
the expected gain from search for customer t obtains as 
Pi - | Jj1[p2+c(L-b-t)2]dp2 + [c(L-b-t)2+p1] dp2j
if the price p2 is observed at shop 1. Consequently, the price p*(t) which makes 
consumer t, t in Aj, indifferent between buying instantaneously without search 
and searching, is given by
P * ( t )  = 2 (L-b-t).
Similarly, the price p*(t) which makes consumer t, t in A^, indifferent between 
buying instantaneously at shop 2, without search and searching is given by
p* (t) = 2 \/£(t-a) .
2
If p <  \j^(L-a-b) = p*(— x-—)» all consumers t in A who first visit seller 1,1 l 2 l
remain in his shop and buy from him since Pj <  p*(t) for all t in A j. If 
\y£(L-a-b) <  p2 all customers in the set
{t|pj <  p*(t)} = {t|t e A j, p̂  <  Z-^/cTfL-b-t)} [0,L-b
still remain in the shop of seller 1, while customers in ]L-b 
and visit seller 2.
L+a-b
leave
Now assume that seller 2 quotes p* = >/T(L-a-b) . If seller 1 quotes a price
 ̂ . . . L+a-b , ., ._ ,pi smaller than p* his revenue is equal to p 2 • — —̂ , while if he quotes a price
p higher than p*, his revenue is equal to p ( L - b  ---- ) . Accordingly p 2 - p*
1 1 1 2 s/c




is smaller or equal to -y{T(L-a-b), i.e. iff p̂  = -̂ /cCL-b) <  yc(L-a-b), a condition 




























































































A similar analysis performed from the viewpoint of seller 2 shows that 
p^ = \^"(L-a-b) is a best reply against p* = iy^(L-a-b) if, and only if, b = 0, 
Accordingly the pair of prices (y£T(L-a~b), >y£"(L~a-b)) is a price equilibrium 
only if both sellers are located at the two extremes of the road,
On the other hand, using arguments similar to those used in the beginning 
of the proof of proposition 1, leads to the conclusion that no other pair of 
prices can be a price equilibrium, In conclusion, there exists no price equilibrium 
when information costs are quadratic, except in the degenerate case where both 
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